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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of globalization, in the sense of increasing inter-
national trade, on the demand for skills in Danish manufacturing companies. The
study is based on a unique data set that enables us to develop rich measures of
international outsourcing and import penetration. Moreover, the data also allows
several strategies to strengthen the causal interpretation of our results. The main
finding of the analysis is that it is of crucial importance to distinguish imports -
both in the form of outsourcing and overall imports - by country-of-origin. We find
that international trade with low-wage countries leads to skill-upgrading. This is
especially pronounced for import penetration with a ceteris paribus contribution
of around fifty percent to skill-upgrading. Moreover, we find that import penetra-
tion in goods originating from high-wage countries lead to skill-downgrading. This
latter result suggests that Danish manufacturing has comparative advantage in skill-
intensive production when compared to low-wage countries, but in unskill-intensive
production when compared to high-wage countries.
Keywords: Skill-upgrading, Low-wage country outsourcing, Low-wage country im-
port penetration, Comparative advantage
JEL: F14, J24; L60
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the implications of globalization - in the form of increasing
international trade - for the demand for skilled and unskilled labor in Danish man-
ufacturing companies, where skills are measured by the educational composition of
the firms’ labor input. The study is based on a unique combination of data sets
yielding a matched employer-employee sample containing information on output,
labor inputs, and international trade, all measured at the firm level, and covering
the period 1999-2002. This data set enables us to develop measures of international
trade at a very detailed level, both in terms of the type of trade and in terms of the
origins of the goods traded.
Specifically, our focus is international outsourcing and import penetration. We
consider two testable hypotheses that are readily derived from standard trade models
of comparative advantages:
• Hypothesis 1: The relative demand for skilled labor increases with the ex-
tent of international outsourcing to low-wage countries; both at the firm and
industry level.
• Hypothesis 2: The relative demand for skilled labor increases with industry
exposure to imports from low-wage countries.
Moreover, we study the eﬀect on the relative demand for skilled labor of exposure
to international trade from high-wage countries; both international outsourcing and
import penetration. According to the standard comparative advantage trade models
it is unclear whether the relative demand for skilled labor should increase, decrease,
or remain unchanged in the case of increasing trade with high-wage countries, as we
have no priors as to whether Danish manufacturing has comparative advantages in
skilled or unskilled labor when compared to other high-wage countries.
International outsourcing is a measure of imported inputs to the production
process - including the final stages of assembly - measured at the firm level. Import
penetration is total imports at the (detailed) industry level and is a measure of
foreign competition in product markets. For both types of international trade, we
distinguish between trade with low-wage versus high-wage countries, in order to
investigate if the impacts of trade are similar irrespective of origin.
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Our main findings are that it is of crucial importance to distinguish international
trade - whether in the form of outsourcing or import penetration - by country-of-
origin. We find that international trade from low-wage countries - both international
outsourcing and import penetration - leads to skill upgrading in Danish manufactur-
ing firms. We also find that import penetration from high-wage countries leads to
skill downgrading. The results established in relation to import-penetration suggests
that Danish manufacturing has comparative advantages in processes that use skilled
labor intensively when compared to low-wage countries and comparative advantages
in processes that use unskilled labor intensively when compared to high-wage coun-
tries.
To evaluate the importance of internationalization for skill-upgrading, we calcu-
late the (ceteris paribus) contributions of each explanatory variable to skill-upgrading.
More precisely, we multiply the mean change in explanatory variables by the match-
ing regression coeﬃcients and divide it by the mean change in dependent variable.
Doing this we find that import penetration from low-wage countries accounts around
fifty percent of the shift towards skilled labor. This is by far the largest contributor
in the analysis and emphasizes the importance of import penetration from low-wage
countries for skill upgrading.
An important feature of globalization, and a driving mechanism for increasing
skill upgrading in developed countries - in the sense of firms employing increasing
fractions of workers with formal education - has been attributed to international
outsourcing. Since the seminal work by Feenstra and Hanson (1996), the idea that
firms oﬀshore productive activities that use unskilled labor intensively to low-wage
countries has been used intensively. Empirically, international outsourcing is often
found to be of significant importance for skill upgrading, see Feenstra and Hanson
1996, 1999), and Feenstra (2004).
The relationship between international outsourcing and skill upgrading is usually
investigated using aggregated measures of international outsourcing based on data
from input-output tables, and hence, they do not distinguish between country-of-
origin, i.e. they do not allow a decomposition of outsourcing to low- and high-wage
countries; exceptions are Ekholm and Hakkala (2006), and Hijzen, Görg and Hine
(2005). Moreover, such aggregated data exclude international outsourcing of the
final stage of production, e.g., assembly; an activity where many low-wage countries
have their comparative advantage, see Ng and Yeats (1999).
In this paper, measures of international outsourcing are based on imports at
the firm level. We develop diﬀerent measures of international outsourcing that
diﬀer with respect to the type of good, its origin, and the level of aggregation.
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More precisely, the type of goods considered includes all imports into the firm,
imports from foreign manufacturing industries only, and imports from the same
foreign industry as that in which the firm is located. With respect to country of
origin, we divide goods according to the level of GDP per capita in the originating
country. The aggregation level varies from the single firm to 316 manufacturing
industries and further to 55 manufacturing industries. The established results are
robust to the use of diﬀerent measures of international outsourcing.
Another important aspect of globalization is that increasing international com-
petition in product markets that force domestic firms out of business or makes them
change their product mix. However, import penetration is often argued to be with-
out empirical relevance for skill upgrading. This view is supported by shift-share
analyses, see for example Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) and Autor, Katz
and Krueger (1998). These studies find that within-industry eﬀects dominate skill-
upgrading, whereas between-industry eﬀects explaining skill-upgrading are modest.
This evidence is interpreted as indicating that increasing competition in final goods
markets is without importance for skill upgrading, because trade is argued to aﬀect
the composition of skills through a changing industry structures.
A recent study by Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006), however, finds that import
penetration plays an important role in the sense that firms adjust their product mix
in response to international trade pressures, especially, when exposure to competi-
tion from low-wage countries is high. This suggests that firms may shift towards
more skill intensive activities as a consequence of increasing international competi-
tion in product markets and that this shift may take place within industries; the
authors also find it crucial to distinguish import penetration by country-of-origin.
Inspired by the findings in Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006), we develop mea-
sures of import penetration broken down by country-of-origin. These measures
are defined as the overall imports from specific foreign manufacturing industries,
and indicate the extent of product market competition from abroad. Hence, we
both introduce measures of international outsourcing and import penetration after
country-of-origin. According to our knowledge, this is the first paper to include both
aspects of internationalization for skill-upgrading.
Methodologically, our study is based on estimation of the translog cost func-
tion, hence, it allows for direct structural interpretation and inference. In order to
strengthen the causal interpretation of the parameters of interest, we reformulate
the translog equations in deviations from firm means, i.e. we specify a fixed eﬀects
type model, thus exploiting only within-firm variation for identification. Moreover,
the diﬀerent levels of aggregation used for the measures international outsourcing
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(e.g. aggregation at diﬀerent manufacturing industry levels) is essentially an instru-
mental variables strategy, and thus it further strengthens the causal interpretation
given to these parameters, while import penetration measures are by construction
aggregate measures.
The next section describes the basic equations in the translog cost model and
discusses the econometric strategy. Section 3 describes the data set applied in the
analysis, as well as the constructed measures of international outsourcing, import
penetration, and a proxy for a potentially confounding variable; skill-biased techno-
logical progress. Section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Econometric Framework
Our empirical specification is based on the so-called translog cost function.1 We
log-linearize the cost function and follow the framework in Brown and Christensen
(1981) assuming the diﬀerent types of labor to be variable inputs and capital to be
a quasi fixed input. What distinguish the present study are two important things,
firstly the specification here applies to the firm level rather than the industry level,
and second, as something new we add international trade measures assumed also to
be quasi fixed inputs 2. Below the model for two labor types is described, whereas
the general model for more labor types - as well as a more detailed derivation of the
translog cost function - is found in the appendix.
The translog cost function generates a wage cost share equation of the following
form:
Sskilled,i,j,t = αskilled,i + β1 ln
µ
wskilled,i,t
wunskilled,i,t
¶
+ β2 ln (Yi,t) + β3 ln (Ki,t)
+β4 ln (LWOUTSi,t) + β5 ln (HWOUTSi,t)
+β6 ln (LWPENj,t) + β7 ln (HWPENj,t)
+β8 ln (TECHi,t) + εskilled,i,t
1The transcendental logarithmic function was developed in Kmenta (1967) to approximate the
CES-function, later applications more closely related to this study is Christensen and Greene (1976)
and Berndt (1991)
2A variable input is assume to be optimally used in the short run, where as a quasi fixed input
is assumed not to be subject of short run optimization, but by second order eﬀects they aﬀect
the decision of how to optimally use the variable inputs. It is standard in this literature to treat
capital as quasi-fixed, see Brown and Christensen (1981). We further argue that the opening of
new markets and technological progress possess the characters of quasi fixed inputs.
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where Sskilled,i,j,t is the cost share of skilled labor to total labor costs in firm i, located
in industry j, observed at time t. The cost share of skilled labor measures the firm’s
demand for skilled labor, which is derived using Shephard’s lemma. wskilled/wunskilled
is the relative wage of skilled labor to unskilled labor, Y is total production, K is
the capital stock, OUTS is international outsourcing, PEN is import penetration,
and TECH is a variable measuring technology level. LW and HW denote low-wage
and high-wage countries, respectively. αskilled,i is a firm fixed eﬀect, and εskilled,i,t is
an i.i.d. error term. The measures of import penetration is industry measures per
se and as such they are labelled j.
In general estimating a translog cost function generates a series of wage cost
share equations, one for each type of variable (labor) input. Imposing the standard
restrictions of symmetry and homogeneity of 1 degree in prices allows us to reach
the specification above where one of the equations are now redundant. In the case
of two labor inputs, the estimates of the similar equation for the wage cost share
of unskilled labor can be recovered from the symmetry restrictions without actually
estimating the equation.
The translog cost function is also estimated for three skill levels, and in this case,
the restrictions have to be incorporated directly into the estimation procedure. We
refer the interested reader to the appendix where the general model for h types of
labor is developed.
In what follows all regressions are performed using Fixed Eﬀects estimation tech-
niques, implying that the model parameters are identified using only variation in
the explanatory variables within firms over time. In the three labor types classi-
fication, this implies that the cost share equations are specified in deviations from
individual firm averages, and this equation is then estimated using restricted maxi-
mum likelihood, incorporating all the structural parameter restrictions. Hence, our
hypothesis is not that the firms with most outsourcing or import penetration has
the highest share of skilled labor, but rather that within a given firm an increase
in outsourcing or import penetration will cause a change towards a larger share of
skilled or educated workers.
Outsourcing measures at the firm level can be criticized due to endogeneity in
the sense that they are determined simultaneously with the firm’s decision regarding
its skill composition. To alleviate these problems, we use an approach based on the
aggregation of the firm specific variables to the most detailed manufacturing indus-
try level. This implies that the endogeneity problem remains only to the extent
that the endogeneity is industry specific. This is similar to an instrumental vari-
ables approach, where the instrumental variable is substituted for the endogenous
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variable directly rather than added in a two-stage regression, see for example Edin,
Fredriksson, and Åslund (2003).
3 Data
The data used in this study mainly originate from administrative registers main-
tained by Statistics Denmark, from which we have constructed a matched employer-
employee database covering the entire population of firms and workers. The sam-
pling unit employed in this study is a ’private manufacturing firm’, and we observe
these annually over the period 1999 to 2002. Specifically, the data sets we use are the
Danish Firm Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (FIDA), the External
Trade Statistics, Input-Output Tables, and Supply and Use Tables from Statistics
Denmark. Moreover, the OECD ANBERD database is applied to construct a proxy
for skill-biased technological change.
In the following sub-sections we describe the construction of the samples used
and the dependent and main explanatory variables. In sub-section 2.1 we focus
on our individual data at the firm and person level, in sub-section 2.2 on how to
construct the applied measures of international trade, and in sub-sections 2.3 we
construct a proxy for skill-biased technological change based on R&D.
3.1 Data at the Firm Level
The FIDA database includes variables for the single firm. It is possible to identify
all workers in each firm for each year, and for each worker we have access to detailed
information on educational attainment and wages. The data thus permit us to
construct wage cost shares for the diﬀerent types of labor at the firm level. We
perform the analyses based on two labor types and three labor types, respectively.
The former classification groups labor in unskilled labor and labor with qualifying
education, whereas the latter classification groups labor in unskilled labor, labor
with vocational skills, and labor with academic education. The choice of dividing
labor into three skill groups as well as the standard two groups is motivated by the
educational system of Denmark, which basically consists of a vocational track and
an academic track. This enables us to study the nature and composition of skill
upgrading in more details.
In the two category classification, skilled labor includes all workers with formal
qualifying education. In the three category classification, the category ’vocational
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education’ includes individuals with vocational education and individuals with a
short academic education. Vocational education is a mix of schooling and training
in firms. The typical duration is 3 years. Short academic educations are typically
rather short and also quite practically oriented, which motivates the grouping. Labor
with academic education (in the three category classification) thus includes workers
with medium or long academic education. Long academic education corresponds to
the master level or more. Medium academic education corresponds to the bachelor
level.
When analyzing two labor types, we include firms with more than 10 employees,
while we restrict the sample to firms with more than 50 employees when the focus
is on three labor types. These sampling restrictions are made in order to avoid the
technical problem of many small firms having zero employees of a given skill type,
which will be a problem in our model for relative labor demand, since it would not be
strictly compatible with the translog cost model, where the relative wages of skilled
and unskilled workers enters as an important explanatory variable. Table A1 in the
appendix presents the share of firms with at least one employee of a given labor type.
It is evident that the majority of firms with more than 10 employees employ unskilled
workers as well as workers with formal skills. Moreover, we find that most firms with
more than 50 employees employ all three labor types, i.e., unskilled, vocational, and
academically educated workers. The few firms the does not employ all labor types
are excluded from our sample. The FIDA database provides additional background
information such as turnover and the capital stock measured by the value of fixed
assets from the firms’ balance sheet. Table A2 in the appendix shows the size of
the diﬀerent samples as well as the measure of turnover and capital. There are
observations for around 5,500 firms with more than 10 employees and 1,400 firms
with more than 50 employees per year. Even with this fairly large reduction in
number of firms, our sample still represents approximately 80 per cent of the total
manufacturing turnover.
Using the relative wage measure at the firm level may be problematic. Endo-
geneity of firms’ wage policies is an issue that we cannot neglect, since wage policies
are a crucial part of the strategic positioning of the firm in the context of global-
ization. To alleviate this problem we use in the empirical analysis the relative wage
measured at the municipality level (mun) included in the analysis. The municipality
group-specific wage measures are calculated from information on individual wage for
all workers of all types.3
3Data on individual wages and working hours are aggregated to the municipality level for
individuals working in the firms that are included in our sample. These aggregates are used to
calculate the relevant hourly wage rate for each labor type in each of Denmark’s 271 municipalities.
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Table 1 presents total wage cost share composition and its development over
the sampling period for the diﬀerent samples of manufacturing firms. The main
impression is that skill upgrading takes places over time even though the sample
only covers four years. Even in this short period we are able to observe changing
wage mix, as the share for people with no education falls with approximately 2
percentage point over the period (a pattern that is even more distinct focusing only
at the number of workers with diﬀerent education), and further this general pattern
is confirmed to be matched in both of our sub-samples.
<Table 1 about here>
3.2 Measuring International Trade
We want to investigate the impact of globalization in the form of increasing interna-
tional trade, especially with low-wage countries, on the relative demand for skilled
and unskilled labor. Table 2 presents the overall import data for Danish firms.
Despite the short time span, imports from low and middle-income countries have
increased from 35 to 49 billions DKK from 1999 to 2002, an increase by more than
one third, and a pattern we see repeated in both samples of manufacturing firms.
<Table 2 about here>
There are several ways of including these import values in the estimation. In
the following the measures of international outsourcing and import penetration are
described. The country-split that we apply are low and middle income countries
(LW) and high income countries (HW) according to 2005 GNI per capita, calculated
using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, $875 or less;
lower middle income, $876 -$3,465; upper middle income, $3,466 - $10,725; and high
income, $10,726 or more. For the exact grouping see http://web.worldbank.org/.
3.2.1 International Outsourcing
The measures of international outsourcing applied here diﬀer from measures based
on data from input-output tables that are usually used in empirical studies, see
for example Feenstra and Hanson (1999). In relation to previously used measures
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of outsourcing, we oﬀer two improvements; (i) we distinguish between country-of-
origin, and (ii) we include international outsourcing of the final stage of production,
e.g., assembly; an activity where many developing countries have their comparative
advantage, see Ng and Yeats (1999). Namely, we have access to international trade
data by country-of-origin, and we have total imports in the individual manufacturing
firm, implying that we have imports of both intermediate input and imports of goods
from the final stage of production. According to our knowledge this paper is the
first to develop measures with both of these features.4
Below we describe three measures of international outsourcing. These measures
are constructed for the firm level as well as the industry level. Moreover, the measures
are broken down in outsourcing to LWand HWcountries. The measures are based on
data for international trade at the firm level by country-of-origin and product type.
These data are from the External Trade Statistics Register of Statistics Denmark
that has been linked to the FIDA database. The main challenge in developing
measures of international outsourcing is to convert the classification for imports by
product type into a classification by industry aﬃliation.
In the External Trade Statistics, trade is categorized by type of product. In
order to convert the product classification for imports to an industry classification,
we apply supply-and-use tables for the relevant years (Statistics Denmark, 1986).
These tables are based on approximately 2750 product accounts, where each prod-
uct account contains information on the supply of a product type, i.e., we obtain
information on domestic industries that produce a given product. This informa-
tion enables us to convert imports by product type to imports by industry after
DB111 industry classification covering 55 manufacturing industries. The implicit
assumption behind this conversion is that foreign business structures are similar to
the Danish in the sense that a product is produced in the same industry abroad
and at home. The DB nomenclature is the Statistics Denmark’s more disaggregated
version of NACE rev. 1 industrial classification. We use this classification system
4A few studies have decomposed international outsourcing by country-of-origin. These are
Ekholm and Hakkala (2006) for Sweden, Geishecker (2006) for Germany, and Anderton and Brenton
(1999) for United Kingdom. In Ekholm and Hakkala (2006) and Geishecker (2006), measures
of international outsourcing are based on input-output tables. Anderton and Brenton (1999)
approximate international outsourcing by constructing import penetration measures for high- and
low-wage countries for the United Kingdom that sub-divides international outsourcing into the
country-groups. Other studies use imports at the firm level and thereby deal with point (ii) above.
Görg, Hanley, and Strobl (2007) use international outsourcing measures based on micro data but
they do not separate them by country-of-origin.
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under diﬀerent levels of aggregations implying 316 manufacturing industries (DB03),
55 industries (DB111), and 13 industries (DB53).
The first measure of international outsourcing is simply based on total imports in
the individual firm in Danish manufacturing and therefore makes no use of supply-
and-use tables. This measure may be criticized since it includes imports of e.g.
energy and agricultural product etc.; that is, goods that are not typically associated
with international outsourcing.
In order to overcome this critique, we develop two additional measures of inter-
national outsourcing; a narrow and a broad measure. The broad measure is defined
as imports from foreign manufacturing industries. The narrow measure is defined
as imports from the same foreign industry as that in which the manufacturing firm
is located. Both measures are suggested by Feenstra and Hanson (1999).
These measures of international outsourcing in firm i, OUTS narrowi,DB111 OUTS
broad
i,DB111,
and OUTS alli are referring to the narrow measure, the broad measure, and the mea-
sure including total imports. They are defined as:
OUTS narrowi,DB111 = Mi,j,k=j
OUTS broadi,DB111 =
ManuX
k
Mi,j,k
OUTS alli =
TotalX
k
Mi,j,k
whereMi,j,k denote the import of firm i, located in domestic industry j, from foreign
industry k. We see that , OUTSnarrowi,DB111 only includes import from the same (DB111)
industry as where firm i is located in the home country, OUTSbroadi,DB111 includes import
from all manufacturing industries, and OUTSalli is the sum of all import to firm i.
Outsourcing measures at the firm level can be criticized due to endogeneity in
the sense that they are determined simultaneously with the firm’s decision regarding
it’s skill composition. To alleviate these problems, we use an instrumental variables
approach, aggregating the outsourcing measures to the most detailed manufacturing
industry level, based on the DB03 industry classification consisting of 316 manu-
facturing industries, and substituting this measure for the firm specific outsourcing
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measure.
OUTS narrowDB03,DB111 =
X
i∈DB03
[Mi,j,k=j]
OUTS broadDB03,DB111 =
X
i∈DB03
"
ManuX
k
Mi,j,k
#
OUTS allDB03 =
X
i∈DB03
"
TotalX
k
Mi,j,k
#
where industry measures OUTS narrowDB03,DB111, OUTS
broad
DB03,DB111, and OUTS
all
DB03 refer
to the narrow measure, the broad measure, and the measure including total imports
at the DB03 industry level, respectively.
The measures of external trade can be decomposed by country-of-origin:
OUTSbh=HWOUTS
b
h + LWOUTS
b
h
where b = (narrow, broad, all), h refers to the aggregation level used, and HW
denotes high-income countries and LW denotes low- and middle-income countries.
3.2.2 Import Penetration
Import penetration for a firm in a given manufacturing industry is measured as total
imports from the same foreign manufacturing industry, and as such it indicates the
extent of product market competition. The measure is an aggregate measure by
nature and is therefore developed for the industry level. The measure is constructed
using two data sources, namely, a unique version of the Danish Input-Output table
for 2000 and the import data for Danish firms. We construct the measure by using
the level of imports in manufacturing industries from the Input-Output table at
the DB111 level covering 55 manufacturing industries and determine the develop-
ment over time using the External Trade Statistics. The measures are calculated
separately for imports from LW- and HW-countries.5
5As described in the main text, the construction of Input-Output tables is based on so-called
supply-and-use tables. These tables are based on approximately 2750 product accounts. Each
product account contains information on the supply of a product (domestic production by industry,
import and supply of investment goods) and the use of a product (intermediate input, consumption,
export, and supply inventories). To distinguish a product by country-of-origin, imports and
exports of the product is combined with the country distribution of import and export for the
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The diﬀerence between import penetration and international outsourcing is that
the former measures total imports from individual foreign manufacturing industries,
whereas the latter measures import from all (or some) foreign manufacturing indus-
tries to the individual Danish manufacturing industry or firm.
The measure of import penetration in industry k ∈ DB111 is defined as
PENk =
TotalX
j
Mj,k
where PENk refers to import penetration, and Mj,k denotes the amount of import
from foreign industry k to domestic industry j. The measures of import penetration
are also calculated separately for LW- and HW-countries:
PENk = HWPENk + LWPENk
3.3 Skill-Biased Technological Change
It is diﬃcult to procure measures for skill-biased technological changes. However,
given the role of skill-biased technological change as a potential confounding variable,
it is important to try to include a measure of it. In the literature, diﬀerent variables
have been used to capture the increasing eﬃciency of skilled and educated labor.
Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) show that the diﬀusion of computers and related
technologies is an important source of changes in the relative demand of skills and
thereby in the relative eﬃciency of skilled labor.
We follow Machin and Van Reenen (1998), who use R&D intensities to explain
skill upgrading. Hence, R&D intensities are used as measures of technological stage
of development using the OECD ANBERD database. R&D data that are com-
patible with the applied databases, i.e., industry-structure ISIC Revision 3 within
manufacturing, only exist for the DB53 level covering 13 such industries within man-
ufacturing. R&D intensities are defined as R&D expenditures in an industry divided
by industry production.
relevant product from the external trade statistics. After having calculated external trade by
country-of-origin for all product accounts, the Input-Output table with external trade divided by
country-of-origin is constructed using the standard method for constructing Input-Output tables,
see Statistics Denmark (1986).
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Table 3 contains a description of the main explanatory variables used in the
empirical model specified below.
<Table 3 about here >
Note that all variables are measured in changes over time. Hence, the skilled workers’
wage share increase by over two percentage points, while at the same time, their
relative wages decline by two log-points. For both the measures of outsourcing
and the measure of import penetration, we observe quite large increases over time,
especially for outsourcing to low-wage countries.
4 Regression Results
Table 4 presents results using diﬀerent measures of internationalization. Models 1-4
include the measure of international outsourcing based on all imports to individual
manufacturing industries, i.e., OUTSallDB03, LWOUTS
all
DB03, and HWOUTS
all
DB03,
where DB03 implies that we use the instrumental variable described in Section 2.2.1
above. It is evident that skill upgrading is more pronounced in firms located in in-
dustries with increasing international outsourcing to low-wage countries. Increasing
outsourcing to high-wage countries does not appear to aﬀect the relative demand for
skilled labor; independent of whether we use instrument or firm specific outsourc-
ing.6
<Table 4 about here>
Next we turn to import penetration in Models 5 and 6. In Model 5, it is seen
that an overall measure of import penetration does not have a statistically signif-
icant impact on the relative demand for skilled labor. However, when calculating
the measure separately for HW and LW countries in Model 6, we see that this
overall picture hides important information. Namely, import penetration has very
6To allow our study more comparability to the existing literature on the eﬀects of international
trade on skill upgrading, we make a short deroute from our micro foundation and perform all regres-
sions using trade intensities instead of our log specification. I.e., instead of e.g. ln (LWOUTSi,t)
we include
³
LWOUTSi,t
Yi
´
. The results are reported in an appendix (Tables A3-A6). The results
are similar to the results presented below, hence, we shall not discuss them further.
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important eﬀects on skill upgrading, but it is crucial to distinguish between imports
from HW and LW countries; firms located in industries exposed to extensive im-
port penetration from low-wage countries increase the relative demand for skilled
labor more than other firms, while firms located in industries with high import
levels from HW countries lower their relative demand for skilled labor, that is, im-
port penetration from high-wage countries leads to skill downgrading. Overall, this
picture suggests that Danish manufacturing firms have comparative advantages in
skill-intensive production when compared to low-wage countries and comparative
advantages in production processes intensive in unskilled labor when compared to
other high-wage countries.
Finally, both the measures of international outsourcing and import penetration
are included in Models 7 to 10. The main results are again that skill upgrading is
aﬀected positively by international outsourcing to low-wage countries and positively
by import penetration from low-wage countries, whereas it is aﬀected negatively by
import penetration from high-wage countries.
Other explanatory variables also aﬀect the relative demand for skilled relative
to unskilled labor. It decreases in the relative price of skilled labor, and is more
or less unaﬀected by the size of the firm in terms of its output. The measure of
the capital stock does not appear to aﬀect the relative demand for skilled versus
unskilled labor. A potential explanation is that time series for physical capital are
smooth and therefore it is diﬃcult statistically to distinguish between a time trend
and the development in physical capital, see for example Islam (1995). In all models
presented in Table 4 the TECH variable capturing technological progress have a
significant positive eﬀect on the relative demand for skilled to unskilled labor.
The measures of international outsourcing applied in Table 4 may be criticized
on the grounds that they include all imports, i.e., imports of e.g. energy and agri-
cultural products are included. To overcome this critique, we re-estimate the models
presented in Table 5 using OUTSbroadDB03,DB111 and OUTS
narrow
DB03,DB111. It is evident that
the conclusions of Table 4 are robust to the change in the measures of international
outsourcing.
<Table 5 about here>
Next, we turn to the case with three labor types; unskilled, vocational, and
academically educated workers. This division is of interest because it is interesting
14
to investigate if skill upgrading takes place between unskilled labor and skilled labor
or between unskilled labor and academically educated labor.
<Tables 6 about here>
The main results are presented in Table 6. For both groups of skilled labor,
vocational and academically educated, the eﬀects of international trade are more or
less the same as in the two skill groups case. The relative demand for both vocational
and academically educated labor is positively aﬀected by import penetration from
low-wage countries, whereas import penetration from high-wage countries leads to
skill downgrading for both types of skilled labor. Moreover, import penetration
from high-wage countries reduces the demand for both types of labor. However,
when it comes to international outsourcing, the relative demand for vocationally
educated labor is positively aﬀected by outsourcing to low-wage countries, while in
general, academically educated labor is not. Finally technological progress is seen
to increase the demand for long educated labor in relations to unskilled labor only,
since vocational labor is seen to be unaﬀected.
It is evident from Table 6 that higher wages of vocational workers in relation to
wages of unskilled workers lead to lower demand for vocational skills. Surprisingly,
such a conclusion can not be made for academic workers, since a wage increase
for this group in relation to unskilled workers lead to higher relative demand for
academic workers. This result can arise because the relative wage for academic
workers enters in the wage share of the group. When the relative wage rate for
academic workers increases, this can result in a higher wage share even when the
employment share decreases and can be due to low substitutability between academic
and unskilled workers and possibly by a larger degree of inertia in layoﬀs within this
group (due to contractional bindings and that they most likely are harder to replace).
The likelihood for this result increases when the time period under investigation is
short as in the present study. We have estimated the regressions of Table 6 using
employment shares as dependent variable and find that higher relative wages of
both vocational and academic education lead to lower demand for the two education
lengths, respectively.
It is also seen that the eﬀect on skill-upgrading from changing relative cross wages
are negative. Taken at face value this suggests that workers with vocational educa-
tion and workers with academic educations are complements, i.e., when the relative
wage for vocational skills increases, the demand for both skill types decreases. It
could, however, also be due to correlation between the two relative wages, which
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could potentially generate the negative correlation between changing relative cross
wages and changing wage shares. Our regressions based on the employment share
as dependent variable, suggest that this is the case.
Demand for vocational skilled workers seems to be mostly unaﬀected by firm size
and capital stock, where as the demand for long educated is decreasing in firm size
and as expected increasing in total amount of capital.
<Table 7 about here>
Again we re-estimate model (5) and (6) from table 6 using OUTSbroadDB03,DB111 and
OUTSnarrowDB03,DB111. Table 7 contains the results. Again we conclude that the results of
Table 6 are fairly robust to the change in the measures of international outsourcing,
even though outsourcing from low wage countries does loose its significance in its
explanatory power on the demand for vocational educated workers.
4.1 Empirical Importance of Internationalization
In order to assess the empirical importance for skill upgrading of the various ex-
planatory variables, we calculate average contributions to skill upgrading using
β1∆ ln
µ
wskilled,mun
wunskilled,mun
¶
/∆Sskilled + β2∆ ln (Yi,t) /∆Sskilled + β3∆ ln (Ki,t) /∆Sskilled
+β4∆ ln
¡
LWOUTSbh,t
¢
/∆Sskilled + β5∆ ln
¡
HWOUTSbh,t
¢
/∆Sskilled
+β6∆ ln (LWPENk,t) /∆Sskilled + β7∆ ln (HWPENk,t) /∆Sskilled
+β8∆ ln (TECHDB53,t) /∆Sskilled = 1
where the ∆ refers to the change in the mean of the variable in question from 1999
to 2002. It is important to emphasize that the contributions determined using this
method are ceteris paribus contributions.
This method enables us to investigate the importance of the increasing interna-
tional trade patterns that may contribute to explaining the observed development
in the relative demand for skilled labor.
<Tables 8 about here>
16
The results are presented in Table 8. It is found that increasing import pen-
etration from low-wage countries on average contributes as much as 40 percent of
skill-upgrading. The result suggests that import penetration from low-wage coun-
tries may be a more considerable driver for skill-upgrading than any other driver
included in the regression.
Turning to the same exercise for 3 types of labor, it is found that the ce-
teris paribus contribution to skill-upgrading from import penetration from low-wage
countries is an astonishing 60 percent for academic education, whereas it equals 20
percent for vocational education. The results are presented in Table 9.
<Tables 9 about here>
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the relationship between skill-upgrading and internationalization.
The study is based on a unique data set for Danish Manufacturing that enables us
to develop measures of international outsourcing and import penetration that focus
on where imports originate rather than on their overall level. The main finding
suggests that it is of crucial importance to distinguish import by country-of-origin.
It is found that international trade from low-wage countries - both international
outsourcing and import penetration - lead to skill-upgrading. Moreover, we find
that import penetration from high-wage countries lead to skill-downgrading.
To evaluate the importance of internationalization for skill-upgrading, we de-
termine the (ceteris paribus) contributions of each explanatory variable to skill-
upgrading. Doing this we find that import penetration from low-wage countries
accounts around fifty percent of the shift towards skilled labor. This is by far the
largest contributor in the analysis and emphasizes the importance of import pene-
tration from low-wage countries for skill upgrading.
The main result that import penetration from low-wage countries is of great
importance for skill-upgrading; especially, for academic education, are really inter-
esting and important. The importance of import penetration for skill-upgrading has
to a large degree been disregarded in the literature for a long time and the focus has
mainly been on international outsourcing. In the Journal of Economic Perspective
summer 1995 there was a symposium on income inequality and trade. For example,
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Wood (1995) "..argue[s] for what is still a minority view among economists: that the
main cause of the deteriorating situation of unskilled workers in developed countries
has been expansion of trade with developing countries." This is not a view that has
had any power of penetration. Our result is somewhat related to the view by Wood
since we find that the fall in demand for unskilled labor relative to skilled labor is
greatly influenced by increasing import penetration from developing countries.
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A Appendix 1: The Model in the general case of
H-types of workers
We analyze the relationship between globalization and the firm’s relative demand for
diﬀerent types of labor within a factor demand framework. The estimated system
of equations is derived from a simple quasi-fixed translog cost function (Christensen
and Greene 1976, Brown and Christensen 1981, Berndt 1991).
The starting point is the cost function C(Y, p) denoting the minimum cost of
producing Y at given prices p evaluated at the relevant cost-minimizing choice of
inputs. By expanding the log of the cost function lnC(Yit, piht) in a second order
Taylor series about the point piht = 0, Yit = 0, where piht denote input prices for
type h labor, and Yit the output in firm i at time t, we obtain
lnC(Yit, piht) = β0 +
HX
h=1
∂ lnCit
∂ ln piht
ln piht +
∂ lnCit
∂ lnYit
lnYit
+
1
2
HX
h=1
HX
m=1
∂2 lnCit
∂ ln piht∂ ln pimt
ln piht ln pimt
+
1
2
∂2 lnCit
∂ lnYit∂ lnYit
(lnYit)
2 +
1
2
HX
h=1
∂2 lnCit
∂ lnYit∂ ln piht
lnYit ln piht
This cost function may contain both variable and quasi-fixed inputs in the vector
piht. In our case the variable inputs are diﬀerent types of workers (by education
groups), with cost given by the wages
PH
h=1wh.
Quasi-fixed inputs can be seen as inputs that are not used optimally (in a long
run sense) in the short run, but are important for the production process. First,
we assume the amount of physical capital K to be quasi-fixed, implying that firms
cannot adjust capital in the short run. Second, our hypothesis is that the production
process in terms of the labor composition might be influenced by international trade,
especially, from low wage countries. Therefore, international outsourcingOUTS and
import penetration PEN are included as quasi-fixed inputs along with measures of
technological progress TECH.
Further identifying the derivatives as our parameters of interest the cost function
can be expressed as:
lnCit = β0 +
PH
h=1 α
w
h lnwiht + α
Y lnYit + αK lnKit + αo lnOUTSit + αo lnPENit
+αo lnTECHit + 12
PH
h=1
PH
m=1 β
w
hm lnwiht lnwimt +
PH
h=1 β
Y
h lnwiht lnYit
+
PH
h=1 β
K
h lnwiht lnKit +
PH
h=1 β
o
h lnwiht ln oit
+
PH
h=1 β
o
h lnwiht lnPENit +
PH
h=1 β
o
h lnwiht lnTECHit
(1)
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Now define Siht as the type h variable cost share of total cost:
Siht =
wihtLiht
HX
m=1
(wimtLimt)
(2)
where Liht denotes the number of workers of type h in firm i at time t.
Using Shephard’s lemma and Young’s rule minimizing with respect to the vari-
able costs we can generate a series of h variable wage cost share equations of the
familiar form:
HX
h=1
Siht =
∂ lnCit
∂ lnwiht
= αh +
HX
m=1
βwhm lnwimt + β
Y
h lnYit + β
K
h lnKit (3)
+βoh lnOUTSit + β
PEN
h lnPENit + β
TECH
h lnTECHit
Next structural restrictions of symmetry and homogeneity of degree one in prices
are imposed on the model. This leads to the following restrictions:
Symmetry:
βwhm = β
w
mh, ∀ h 6= m (R1)
Homogeneity:
Denoting the number of variable cost inputs h and the total number of variables
m, this implies m+ 1 cross equation restrictions:
HX
h=1
αh = 1,
HX
h=1
βwhm = 0 ∀ m,
HX
h=1
βmh = 0,
HX
h=1
βYh = 0 and
HX
h=1
βQh = 0
(R2)
and h within equation restriction7:
HX
m=1
βwhm = 0 ∀ h (R3)
The symmetry restrictions in (R1) are simply forced upon our model using a full
information simultaneous maximum likelihood estimation approach. Where as the
7Note that with symmetry imposed these are actually redundant!
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cross and within equation restrictions in (R2) and (R3) are imposed by the division
with one of the price variables (here for simplicity, we choose the log wages of those
persons with the lowest qualifying education denoted by lnw1), in each equation.
This leaves us with a singular system of equations, where all parameters are
included twice, a problem which is circumvented by leaving out the first equation.
Therefore, the following system of H −1 equations is estimated:
HX
h=2
Siht =
HX
h=2
Ã
αh +
HX
m=2
βwhm ln
µ
wimt
wi1t
¶
+ βYh lnYit + β
K
h lnKit + β
Q
h lnQit
!
(4)
imposing the assumption of symmetry in (R1). Finally, the restrictions in (R2) and
(R3) are used to recover the parameter estimates of type 1 workers.
B Appendix 2: Appendix tables
<Table A1 about here>
<Table A2 about here>
<Table A3 about here>
<Table A4 about here>
<Table A5 about here>
<Table A6 about here>
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Table 1: Total Wage Cost Shares Composition in Danish Manufacturing 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
  
-------------------- All Manufacturing Firms -------------------- 
Total Number of 
Workers         442,597          448,388         441,375         427,669  
Wage: No 
Education 33.9% 33.6% 32.7% 31.9% 
Wage: Vocational 
Education 44.5% 44.8% 44.9% 44.8% 
Wage: Short 
Academic 
Education 6.4% 6.5% 6.7% 7.0% 
Wage: Medium 
Academic 
Education 9.2% 9.1% 9.2% 9.3% 
Wage: Long 
Academic 
Education 6.0% 6.1% 6.5% 6.9% 
  
----- Manufacturing Firms with 10 or More Employees ----- 
Total Number of 
Workers         401,381          408,741         401,706         390,666  
Wage: No 
Education 33.9% 33.5% 32.6% 31.9% 
Wage: All 
Educations 66.1% 66.5% 67.4% 68.1% 
  
----- Manufacturing Firms with 50 or More Employees ----- 
Total Number of 
Workers         320,207          329,516         323,802         314,869  
Wage: No 
Education 34.3% 33.9% 33.0% 32.2% 
Wage: Vocational 
or Short 
Academic 
Education 48.4% 49.0% 49.4% 49.5% 
Wage: Medium or 
Long Academic 
Education 17.3% 17.1% 17.6% 18.3% 
Table 2: Imports in Danish Firms by Country-of-Origin’s Income per Capita.  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 --------------------------------------------- All Firms ---------------------------------------------
Total 256.1 261.0 293.1 309.8 310.6 358.9 331.0 346.4
 
High Income OECD 
Countries 220.9 223.8 249.8 264.8 263.3 299.1 269.2 284.8
 
High Income Non-
OECD Countries 7.1 7.0 8.0 8.3 8.8 12.1 9.8 9.9
 
Upper Middle 
Income Countries 13.5 14.5 16.4 17.8 19.0 24.0 28.4 28.0
 
Lower Middle 
Income Countries 9.7 10.3 13.7 13.5 14.1 17.3 17.1 16.7
 
Low Income 
Countries 2.7 3.2 2.9 3.2 3.0 3.7 3.9 4.2
 
Unknown 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.7
 
  
-------- All Manufacturing Firms -------
Low and Middle 
Income Countries 
  
10.9 12.7 14.6 14.2
 
High Income 
Countries 
  
61.2 69.7 79.6 80.3
 
  
Manufacturing Firms with 
-------- 10 or More Employees -------- 
Low and Middle  
Income Countries 
  
10.5 12.3 14.0 13.8
 
High Income 
Countries 
  
60.1 68.5 77.8 79.0
 
   
Manufacturing Firms with 
-------- 50 or More Employees -------- 
Low and Middle 
Income Countries 
  
8.6 10.3 11.9 11.3
 
High Income 
Countries 
  
53.8 61.1 70.0 70.3
 
 
Table 3. Mean values over firms, change from1999-2002, all variables. 
 2 groups  3 groups 
 Mean Std 
dev 
Obs  Mean Std 
dev 
Obs 
   
GENERAL EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES 
 
 
Wage Share, skilled 0.02 0.26 4814     
Wage Share, vocational skills     0.02 0.19 1355 
Wage Share, long education     0.01 0.17 1355 
Relative wagemun, skilled -0.02 0.09 4814     
Relative wagemun, vocational skills     -0.02 0.09 1355 
Relative wagemun, long education     -0.01 0.16 1355 
ln(Yi) 0.17 1.78 4814  0.18 1.46 1355 
ln(Ki) 0.16 1.98 4814  0.19 1.72 1355 
        
OUTSOURCING        
ln( allDBOUTS 03 ) 0.26 2.29 4801  0.16 2.36 1353 
ln( allDBLWOUTS 03 ) 0.54 3.18 4591  0.41 3.18 1288 
ln( allDBHWOUTS 03 ) 0.23 2.26 4798  0.14 2.33 1353 
ln( broad DBDBOUTS 111,03 ) 0.24 2.30 4793  0.15 2.38 1352 
ln broad DBDBLWOUTS 111,03 ) 0.56 3.31 4558  0.36 3.27 1262 
ln( broad DBDBHWOUTS 111,03 ) 0.22 2.26 4788  0.13 2.35 1352 
ln( narrowDBDBOUTS 111,03 ) 0.32 2.61 4744  0.24 2.73 1327 
ln( narrowDBDBLWOUTS 111,03 ) 0.31 3.42 3992  0.25 3.39 1140 
ln( narrowDBDBHWOUTS 111,03 ) 0.27 2.58 4741  0.19 2.71 1326 
    
IMPORT PENETRATION    
ln(PENDB111) 0.10 1.77 4814  0.07 2.04 1355 
ln(LWPENDB111) 0.44 1.99 4814  0.40 2.27 1355 
ln(HWPENDB111) 0.06 1.77 4814  0.03 2.05 1355 
     
R&D       
ln(TECH DB53) 0.39 2.16 4806  0.38 2.17 1352 
     
       
    
Note: Only firms with values different from zero in 1999 and 2002 are included for each variable. 
 
Table 4: Change in Skilled Wage Share as Dependent Variable, 1999-2002,  
Fixed Effects Estimation Two Education Groups, Outsourcing Measures allDBOUTS 03  and 
allOUTS  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Relative wagemun, 
skilled -0,0466 -0,0466 -0,0441 -0,0466 -0,0483 -0,0213 -0,0466 -0,0468 -0,0205 -0,0211
 (3.24)** (3.24)** (3.07)** (3.25)** (3.36)** (1,47) (3.24)** (3.26)** (1,41) (1,45)
ln(Yi) -0,0029 -0,0028 -0,0031 -0,0030 -0,0027 -0,0047 -0,0029 -0,0028 -0,0048 -0,0049
 (1,47) (1,44) (1,59) (1,55) (1,36) (2.40)* (1,48) (1,44) (2.46)* (2.48)*
ln(Ki) -0,0011 -0,0011 -0,0012 -0,0011 -0,0011 -0,0014 -0,0011 -0,0010 -0,0014 -0,0014
 (0,71) (0,67) (0,72) (0,70) (0,65) (0,87) (0,68) (0,64) (0,88) (0,89)
ln(OUTSDB03) 0,0014 0,0015
 (2.12)* (2.32)*
ln(OUTS)  -0,0004 -0,0004
  (0,86) (0,82)
ln(LWOUTSDB03)  0,0021 0,0011
  (4.09)** (2.22)*
ln(HWOUTSDB03)  -0,0002 -0,0001
  (0,24) (0,10)
ln(LWOUTS)  0,0011 0,0010
  (2.32)* (2.16)*
ln(HWOUTS)  -0,0005 -0,0004
  (1,18) (0,96)
ln(PENDB111)  -0,0015 -0,0017 -0,0014
  (1,53) (1,79) (1,47)
ln(LWPENDB111)  0,0176 0,0167 0,0173
  (10.84)** (10.07)** (10.58)**
ln(HWPENDB111)  -0,0187 -0,0181 -0,0183
  (10.47)** (10.01)** (10.22)**
ln(TECH DB53) 0,0051 0,0050 0,0051 0,0050 0,0055 0,0029 0,0054 0,0052 0,0030 0,0028
 (4.94)** (4.81)** (4.89)** (4.75)** (5.24)** (2.75)** (5.14)** (4.97)** (2.81)** (2.62)**
           
Observations 20184 20184 20184 20184 20184 20184 20184 20184 20184 20184
Number of Firms 6612 6612 6612 6612 6612 6612 6612 6612 6612 6612
Note: * significant at 5 % level; ** significant at 1 % level
Table 5: Change in Skilled Wage Share as Dependent Variable, 1999-2002,  
Fixed Effects Estimation Two Education Groups, Outsourcing Measures narrowDBDBOUTS 111,03  and 
broad
DBDBOUTS 111,03  
 broad DBDBOUTS 111,03=Ω  broad DBDBOUTS 111,03=Ω narrowDBDBOUTS 111,03=Ω narrowDBDBOUTS 111,03=Ω
 (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Relative wagemun, 
skilled -0,0464 -0,0204 -0,0465 -0,0234
 (3.23)** (1,40) (3.23)** (1,61)
ln(Yi) -0,0029 -0,0048 -0,0029 -0,0049
 (1,48) (2.45)* (1,47) (2.51)*
ln(Ki) -0,0011 -0,0014 -0,0011 -0,0013
 (0,68) (0,89) (0,69) (0,82)
ln(Ω) 0,0017 0,0015
 (2.56)* (2.44)*
ln(LWΩ)  0,0009 0,0006
  (1,89) (1,58)
ln(HWΩ)  0,0000 0,0003
  (0,03) (0,56)
ln(PENDB111) -0,0017 -0,0017
 (1,79) (1,77)
ln(LWPENDB111)  0,0168 0,0171
  (10.12)** (10.36)**
ln(HWPENDB111)  -0,0181 -0,0184
  (10.05)** (10.26)**
ln(TECH DB53) 0,0054 0,0030 0,0053 0,0030
 (5.15)** (2.83)** (5.04)** (2.82)**
  
Observations 20184 20184 20184 20294
Number of Firms 6612 6612 6612 6649
Note: * significant at 5 % level; ** significant at 1 % level 
 
Table 6: Change in Skilled and Educated Wage Share as Dependent Variable, 1999-2002,  
Fixed Effects Estimation, Three Education Groups, Outsourcing Measures allOUTS and allDBOUTS 03  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 ------------------- Wage Share, Vocational Education ------------------- 
Relative wagemun, 
Vocational skills -0,0161 -0,0167 -0,0166 -0,0169 -0,0178 -0,0086 -0,0159 -0,0163 -0,0077 -0,0082 
 (1,15) (1,19) (1,18) (1,20) (1,27) (0,61) (1,13) (1,17) (0,55) (0,58) 
Relative wagemun, 
Long education -0,0265 -0,0264 -0,0265 -0,0262 -0,0263 -0,0234 -0,0264 -0,0262 -0,0235 -0,0233 
 (4.40)** (4.37)** (4.39)** (4.35)** (4.36)** (3.89)** (4.38)** (4.35)** (3.92)** (3.87)** 
ln(Yi) 0,0037 0,0034 0,0038 0,0033 0,0043 0,0029 0,0037 0,0034 0,0025 0,0021 
 (1,76) (1,61) (1,84) (1,55) (2.07)* (1,41) (1,75) (1,59) (1,20) (0,98) 
ln(Ki) -0,0014 -0,0012 -0,0013 -0,0013 -0,0012 -0,0018 -0,0014 -0,0012 -0,0018 -0,0019 
 (0,68) (0,58) (0,63) (0,65) (0,62) (0,92) (0,69) (0,59) (0,89) (0,93) 
ln(OUTSDB03) 0,0023  0,0023  
 (3.80)**  (3.66)**  
ln(OUTS)  -0,0002   -0,0262  
  (0,57)   (4.35)**  
ln(LWOUTSDB03)  0,0012   0,0008  
  (2.68)**   (1,68)  
ln(HWOUTSDB03)  0,0006  0,0008  
  (0,81)  (1,19)  
ln(LWOUTS)  -0,0004  -0,0004 
  (1,40)  (1,31) 
ln(HWOUTS)  0,0013   0,0015 
  (0,33)   (0,40) 
ln(PENDB111)  0,0014  0,0010 0,0014  
  (1,51)  (1,16) (1,51)  
ln(LWPENDB111)   0,0102 0,0099 0,0097 
   (6.76)** (6.47)** (6.38)** 
ln(HWPENDB111)   -0,0090 -0,0089 -0,0086 
   (5.30)** (5.22)** (4.99)** 
ln(TECH DB53) 0,0016 0,0014 0,0017 0,0013 0,0015 0,0002 0,0015 0,0013 0,0004 0,0000 
 (1,69) (1,44) (1,82) (1,36) (1,58) (0,22) (1,59) (1,30) (0,37) (0,03) 
Table 6: Change in Skilled and Educated Wage Share as Dependent Variable, 1999-2002 - (continued) 
 ------------------- Wage Share, Academic Education ------------------- 
Relative wagemun, 
Vocational skills -0,0265 -0,0264 -0,0265 -0,0262 -0,0263 -0,0234 -0,0264 -0,0262 -0,0235 -0,0233 
 (4.40)** (4.37)** (4.39)** (4.35)** (4.36)** (3.89)** (4.38)** (4.35)** (3.92)** (3.87)** 
Relative wagemun, 
Long education 0,0308 0,0308 0,0306 0,0307 0,0309 0,0317 0,0309 0,0309 0,0316 0,0315 
 (5.76)** (5.75)** (5.73)** (5.73)** (5.78)** (5.96)** (5.78)** (5.77)** (5.95)** (5.93)** 
ln(Yi) -0,0173 -0,0172 -0,0174 -0,0173 -0,0174 -0,0191 -0,0174 -0,0173 -0,0191 -0,0188 
 (10.30)** (10.09)** (10.38)** (10.14)** (10.40)** (11.43)** (10.31)** (10.11)** (11.36)** (11.07)** 
ln(Ki) 0,0105 0,0104 0,0101 0,0103 0,0104 0,0097 0,0105 0,0104 0,0095 0,0096 
 (6.49)** (6.44)** (6.25)** (6.37)** (6.42)** (6.03)** (6.48)** (6.43)** (5.92)** (5.98)** 
ln(OUTSDB03) -0,0003 -0,0004  
 (0,61) (0,77)  
ln(OUTS)  -0,0002 -0,0002  
  (0,57) (0,61)  
ln(LWOUTSDB03)  0,0012 0,0006  
  (3.17)** (1,76)  
ln(HWOUTSDB03)  -0,0009 -0,0006  
  (1,59) (1,09)  
ln(LWOUTS)  0,0003 0,0003 
  (1,36) (1,14) 
ln(HWOUTS)  -0,0004 -0,0004 
  (1,40) (1,31) 
ln(PENDB111)  0,0012 0,0011 0,0012  
  (1,61) (1,56) (1,63)  
ln(LWPENDB111)  0,0116 0,0112 0,0115 
  (9.62)** (9.21)** (9.41)** 
ln(HWPENDB111)  -0,0104 -0,0101 -0,0102 
  (7.60)** (7.37)** (7.44)** 
ln(TECH DB53) 0,0050 0,0051 0,0050 0,0049 0,0050 0,0034 0,0049 0,0050 0,0034 0,0034 
 (6.42)** (6.61)** (6.44)** (6.37)** (6.43)** (4.35)** (6.26)** (6.43)** (4.25)** (4.31)** 
Observations 5651 5651 5651 5651 5651 5651 5651 5651 5651 5651 
Note: * significant at 5 % level; ** significant at 1 % level
Table 7: Change in Skilled and Educated Wage Share as Dependent Variable, 1999-2002,  
Fixed Effects Estimation, Three Education Groups, Outsourcing Measures broad DBDBOUTS 111,03  and 
narrow
DBDBOUTS 111,03  
 broDBOUTS=Ω broad DBDBOUTS 111,03=Ω narrowDBDBOUTS 111,03=Ω narrowDBDBOUTS 111,03=Ω
 (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 ------------------- Wage Share, Vocational Education ------------------
- 
Relative wagemun, Vocational skills -0,0161 -0,0076 -0,0181 -0,0078
 (1,15) (0,54) (1,29) (0,55)
Relative wagemun, Long education -0,0264 -0,0234 -0,0260 -0,0234
 (4.38)** (3.88)** (4.31)** (3.88)**
ln(Yi,) 0,0038 0,0025 0,0043 0,0029
 (1,80) (1,20) (2.07)* (1,40)
ln(Ki,) -0,0014 -0,0019 -0,0012 -0,0019
 (0,68) (0,96) (0,62) (0,97)
ln(Ω) 0,0020 0,0000 
 (3.38)** (0,01) 
ln(LWΩ) 0,0004  0,0005
 (0,95)  (1,27)
ln(HWΩ) 0,0013  -0,0006
 (2.05)*  (0,97)
ln(PENDB111) 0,0011 0,0014 
 (1,24) (1,50) 
ln(LWPENDB111) 0,0099  0,0103
 (6.46)**  (6.73)**
ln(HWPENDB111) -0,0089  -0,0091
 (5.20)**  (5.33)**
ln(TECH DB53) 0,0015 0,0003 0,0015 0,0003
 (1,59) (0,30) (1,56) (0,34)
 ------------------- Wage Share, Academic Education -------------------
Relative wagemun, Vocational skills -0,0264 -0,0234 -0,0260 -0,0234
 (4.38)** (3.88)** (4.31)** (3.88)**
Relative wagemun, Long education 0,0310 0,0316 0,0311 0,0317
 (5.79)** (5.95)** (5.81)** (5.97)**
ln(Yi,) -0,0173 -0,0190 -0,0178 -0,0195
 (10.30)** (11.33)** (10.59)** (11.63)**
ln(Ki,) 0,0105 0,0096 0,0103 0,0096
 (6.47)** (6.00)** (6.40)** (5.98)**
ln(Ω) -0,0005 0,0013 
 (1,03) (2.71)** 
ln(LWΩ) 0,0007  0,0008
 (2.10)*  (2.55)*
ln(HWΩ) -0,0010  0,0004
 (1.97)*  (0,92)
ln(PENDB111) 0,0012 0,0010 
 (1,58) (1,34) 
ln(LWPENDB111) 0,0112  0,0110
 (9.11)**  (8.99)**
ln(HWPENDB111) -0,0100  -0,0100
 (7.29)**  (7.31)**
ln(TECH DB53) 0,0049 0,0035 0,0048 0,0035
 (6.30)** (4.39)** (6.23)** (4.45)**
Observations 5651 5651 5651 5651
Note: * significant at 5 % level; ** significant at 1 % level
Table 8: (Ceteris Paribus) Contributions of Explanatory Variables to Skill-Upgrading – Two 
Category Classification of Skills 
           
 (1) (3) (5) (6) (7) (9) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Relative wagemun, 
skilled 4% 4% 4% 2% 4% 2% 4% 2% 4% 2%
ln(Yi,) -2% -3% -2% -4% -3% -4% -3% -4% -2% -4%
ln(Ki,) -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1%
ln(OUTSDB03) 2%    2%  2%  2%  
ln(LWOUTSDB03)  6%    3%  3%  1%
ln(HWOUTSDB03)  0%    0%  0%  0%
ln(PENDB111)   -1%  -1%  -1%  -1%  
ln(LWPENDB111)    40%  39%  39%  39%
ln(HWPENDB111)    -6%  -6%  -6%  -6%
ln(TECH DB53) 10% 10% 11% 6% 11% 6% 11% 6% 11% 6%
 
Table 9: (Ceteris Paribus) Contributions of Explanatory Variables to Skill-Upgrading – Three 
Category Classification of Skills 
           
 (1) (3) (5) (6) (7) (9) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 ------------------- Wage Share, Vocational Education ------------------- 
Relative wagemun, 
Vocational skills 
1,4% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1%
Relative wagemun, 
Long education 
1,5% 2% 2% 1% 2% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1%
ln(Yi,) 3% 4% 4% 3% 3% 2% 4% 2% 4% 3%
ln(Ki,) -1% -1% -1% -2% -1% -2% -1% -2% -1% -2%
ln(OUTSDB03) 2%  2% 2%  0%
ln(LWOUTSDB03) 3% 2%  1% 1%
ln(HWOUTSDB03) 0% 1%  1% -1%
ln(PENDB111)  1% 0% 0%  1%
ln(LWPENDB111)  21% 21%  21% 22%
ln(HWPENDB111)  -1% -1%  -1% -1%
ln(TECH DB53) 3% 4% 3% 0% 3% 1% 3% 1% 3% 1%
 ------------------- Wage Share, Academic Education ------------------- 
Relative wagemun, 
Vocational skills 
5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Relative wagemun, 
Long education 
-4% -4% -4% -4% -4% -4% -4% -4% -4% -4%
ln(Yi,) -39% -40% -40% -43% -39% -43% -39% -43% -40% -44%
ln(Ki,) 26% 25% 25% 24% 26% 23% 26% 24% 25% 23%
ln(OUTSDB03) -1%  -1% -1%  4%
ln(LWOUTSDB03) 6% 3%  3% 2%
ln(HWOUTSDB03) -2% -1%  -2% 1%
ln(PENDB111)  1% 1% 1%  1%
ln(LWPENDB111)  58% 56%  56% 55%
ln(HWPENDB111)  -4% -4%  -4% -4%
ln(TECH DB53) 24% 24% 24% 16% 23% 16% 23% 17% 23% 17%
 
 
Table A1: Share of Firms with at Least one Employee of a Given Educational Length 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
  
-------------------- All Manufacturing Firms -------------------- 
No Education 84.8% 83.8% 83.1% 82.5% 
Vocational 
Education 86.2% 86.3% 86.5% 86.5% 
Short Academic 
Education 30.6% 31.2% 31.9% 32.3% 
Medium 
Academic 
Education 30.1% 30.8% 31.2% 31.4% 
Long Academic 
Education 18.3% 18.9% 19.4% 20.2% 
  
----- Manufacturing Firms With 10 or More Employees ----- 
No Education 99.5% 99.4% 99.3% 99.1% 
All Educations 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 
  
----- Manufacturing Firms With 50 or More Employees ----- 
No Education 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Vocational or 
Short Academic 
Education 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Medium or Long 
Academic 
Education 95.8% 96.0% 96.3% 96.6% 
 
 
Table A2: Number of Firms, Aggregate Turnover and Capital Stock in Danish Manufacturing 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
  
-------------------- All Manufacturing Firms -------------------- 
Number of Firms           13,341            13,132            12,788            12,379  
Turnover in 
Billions D.Kr.               465                518                552                550  
Capital in Billions 
D.Kr.               434                478                488                496  
  
----- Manufacturing Firms with 10 or More employees ----- 
Number of Firms             5,205              5,146              5,019              4,814  
Turnover in 
Billions D.Kr.               436                488                521                521  
Capital in Billions 
D.Kr.               414                457                468                475  
  
----- Manufacturing Firms with 50 or More employees ----- 
Number of Firms             1,420              1,460              1,416              1,355  
Turnover in 
Billions D.Kr.               362                413                444                444  
Capital in Billions 
D.Kr.               363                405                416                422  
 
Table A3: Using Intensities: Change in Skilled Wage Share as Dependent Variable, 1999-2002,  
Fixed Effects Estimation Two Education Groups, Outsourcing Measures allOUTS  and allDBOUTS 03
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Relative wagemun, 
skilled -0,0495 -0,0500 -0,0483 -0,0505 -0,0506 -0,0484 -0,0500 -0,0506 -0,0475 -0,0489
 (3.45)** (3.49)** (3.37)** (3.52)** (3.53)** (3.38)** (3.49)** (3.53)** (3.31)** (3.41)**
ln(Yi,) -0,0024 -0,0023 -0,0024 -0,0025 -0,0024 -0,0024 -0,0025 -0,0024 -0,0025 -0,0026
 (1,23) (1,18) (1,23) (1,29) (1,23) (1,24) (1,27) (1,20) (1,28) (1,35)
ln(Ki) -0,0012 -0,0012 -0,0012 -0,0010 -0,0011 -0,0012 -0,0012 -0,0012 -0,0013 -0,0011
 (0,74) (0,72) (0,76) (0,64) (0,71) (0,75) (0,74) (0,71) (0,79) (0,67)
OUTSDB03/ YDB03 0,0119  0,0164
 (1,24)  (1,69)
OUTS/ Y  0,0002  0,0003
  (0,06)  (0,09)
LWOUTSDB03/ YDB03  0,0887  0,0758
  (3.20)**  (2.58)**
HWOUTSDB03/ YDB03  -0,0037  0,0000
  (0,34)  0,00 
LWOUTS/ Y  0,0140  0,0134
  (2.39)*  (2.30)*
HWOUTS/ Y  -0,0092  -0,0094
  (1,93)  (1.97)*
PENDB111/ YDB111  -0,0780  -0,0891 -0,0780
  (2.23)*  (2.50)* (2.23)*
LWPENDB111/ YDB111  0,5231 0,3803 0,5142
  (3.24)** (2.23)* (3.19)**
HWPENDB111/ YDB111  -0,2164 -0,2048 -0,2155
  (4.30)** (4.02)** (4.28)**
TECHDB53/ YDB53 0,2835 0,2884 0,2775 0,2867 0,2863 0,2723 0,2791 0,2861 0,2641 0,2708
 (5.07)** (5.17)** (4.96)** (5.14)** (5.13)** (4.87)** (4.99)** (5.13)** (4.72)** (4.85)**
   
Observations 20184 20184 20184 20184 20184 20184 20184 20184 20184 20184
Number of Firms 6612 6612 6612 6612 6612 6612 6612 6612 6612 6612
Note: * significant at 5 % level; ** significant at 1 % level 
Table A4: Using Intensities: Change in Skilled Wage Share as Dependent Variable, 1999-2002,  
Fixed Effects Estimation Two Education Groups, Outsourcing Measures broad DBDBOUTS 111,03  and 
narrow
DBDBOUTS 111,03  
 broad DBDBOUTS 111,03=Ω  broad DBDBOUTS 111,03=Ω narrowDBDBOUTS 111,03=Ω narrowDBDBOUTS 111,03=Ω
 (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Relative wagemun, 
skilled -0,0502 -0,0474 -0,0505 -0,0472
 (3.50)** (3.31)** (3.53)** (3.29)**
ln(Yi,) -0,0025 -0,0025 -0,0024 -0,0025
 (1,27) (1,28) (1,25) (1,30)
ln(Ki) -0,0012 -0,0013 -0,0012 -0,0012
 (0,73) (0,79) (0,71) (0,77)
Ω/ YDB03 0,0162 0,0084
 (1,60) (0,77)
LWΩ/ YDB03 0,0978 0,0920
 (3.07)** (2.92)**
HWΩ/ YDB03 -0,0014 -0,0052
 (0,13) (0,42)
PENDB111/ YDB111 -0,0889 -0,0792
 (2.49)* (2.26)*
LWPENDB111/ YDB111 0,3515 0,4883
 (2.06)* (3.01)**
HWPENDB111/ YDB111 -0,2035 -0,2093
 (4.00)** (4.13)**
TECHDB53/ YDB53 0,2798 0,2649 0,2843 0,2646
 (5.00)** (4.73)** (5.09)** (4.73)**
 
Observations 20184 20184 20184 20184
Number of Firms 6612 6612 6612 6612
Note: * significant at 5 % level; ** significant at 1 % level 
Table A5: Using Intensities: Change in Skilled and Educated Wage Share as Dependent Variable, 1999-2002,  
Fixed Effects Estimation, Three Education Groups, Outsourcing Measure allDBOUTS 03  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 ------------------- Wage Share, Vocational Education ------------------- 
Relative wagemun, Vocational skills -0,0171 -0,0173 -0,0150 -0,0174 -0,0174 -0,0144 -0,0172 -0,0173 -0,0138 -0,0144
 (1,22) (1,23) (1,07) (1,24) (1,24) (1,02) (1,22) (1,23) (0,98) (1,02)
Relative wagemun, Long education -0,0268 -0,0268 -0,0265 -0,0266 -0,0271 -0,0265 -0,0270 -0,0269 -0,0263 -0,0264
 (4.45)** (4.45)** (4.40)** (4.41)** (4.49)** (4.39)** (4.47)** (4.46)** (4.35)** (4.36)**
ln(Yi,) 0,0043 0,0045 0,0043 0,0045 0,0044 0,0044 0,0043 0,0045 0,0043 0,0044
 (2.09)* (2.16)* (2.10)* (2.16)* (2.11)* (2.11)* (2.09)* (2.16)* (2.09)* (2.12)*
ln(Ki) -0,0014 -0,0015 -0,0016 -0,0015 -0,0014 -0,0016 -0,0015 -0,0015 -0,0017 -0,0016
 (0,72) (0,73) (0,78) (0,73) (0,69) (0,79) (0,73) (0,73) (0,83) (0,80)
OUTSDB03/ YDB03 0,0075  0,0080
 (0,87)  (0,91)
OUTS/ Y 0,0030   0,0030
 (0,60)   (0,60)
LWOUTSDB03/ YDB03 0,0949    0,0837
 (3.90)**    (3.23)**
HWOUTSDB03/ YDB03 -0,0101   -0,0084
 (1,03)   (0,86)
LWOUTS/ Y  0,0042  -0,0032
  (0,30)  (0,22)
HWOUTS/ Y 0,0027  0,0024
 (0,51)  (0,45)
PENDB111/ YDB111  -0,0030  -0,0096 -0,0038
 (0,09)  (0,28) (0,11)
LWPENDB111/ YDB111  0,4744 0,2754 0,4794
 (2.73)** (1,49) (2.71)**
HWPENDB111/ YDB111 -0,0828 -0,0667 -0,0831
 (1,88) (1,49) (1,88)
TECHDB53/ YDB53 0,1423 0,1432 0,1372 0,1431 0,1443 0,1367 0,1414 0,1429 0,1319 0,1362
 (2.76)** (2.78)** (2.67)** (2.78)** (2.80)** (2.65)** (2.74)** (2.77)** (2.56)* (2.64)**
Table A5: Using Intensities: Change in Skilled and Educated Wage Share as Dependent Variable, 1999-2002, - (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 ------------------- Wage Share, Academic Education ------------------- 
Relative wagemun, Vocational skills -0,0268 -0,0268 -0,0265 -0,0266 -0,0271 -0,0265 -0,0270 -0,0269 -0,0263 -0,0264
 (4.45)** (4.45)** (4.40)** (4.41)** (4.49)** (4.39)** (4.47)** (4.46)** (4.35)** (4.36)**
Relative wagemun, Long education 0,0301 0,0301 0,0303 0,0300 0,0299 0,0301 0,0300 0,0301 0,0302 0,0300
 (5.61)** (5.63)** (5.65)** (5.60)** (5.58)** (5.62)** (5.59)** (5.61)** (5.64)** (5.61)**
ln(Yi,) -0,0172 -0,0168 -0,0172 -0,0167 -0,0171 -0,0171 -0,0172 -0,0168 -0,0172 -0,0168
 (10.23)** (9.96)** (10.25)** (9.91)** (10.19)** (10.22)** (10.24)** (9.97)** (10.27)** (9.97)**
ln(Ki) 0,0103 0,0102 0,0103 0,0100 0,0104 0,0102 0,0103 0,0102 0,0101 0,0099
 (6.37)** (6.28)** (6.33)** (6.18)** (6.43)** (6.32)** (6.36)** (6.28)** (6.26)** (6.12)**
OUTSDB03/ YDB03 0,0123 0,0134
 (1,77) (1,88)
OUTS/ Y 0,0086 0,0087
 (2.17)* (2.18)*
LWOUTSDB03/ YDB03 0,0615 0,0492
 (3.13)** (2.35)*
HWOUTSDB03/ YDB03 0,0024  0,0044
 (0,31)  (0,55)
LWOUTS/ Y  0,0427 0,0380
  (3.77)** (3.28)**
HWOUTS/ Y 0,0028 0,0026
 (0,64) (0,59)
PENDB111/ YDB111 -0,0083 -0,0195 -0,0108
 (0,31) (0,70) (0,40)
LWPENDB111/ YDB111 0,4247 0,3035 0,3263
 (3.04)** (2.04)* (2.29)*
HWPENDB111/ YDB111 -0,0813 -0,0776 -0,0742
 (2.28)* (2.15)* (2.08)*
TECHDB53/ YDB53 0,2385 0,2384 0,2355 0,2361 0,2417 0,2342 0,2367 0,2376 0,2290 0,2296
 (5.73)** (5.74)** (5.66)** (5.68)** (5.81)** (5.63)** (5.68)** (5.71)** (5.49)** (5.52)**
Observations 5651 5651 5651 5651 5651 5651 5651 5651 5651 5651
Note: * significant at 5 % level; ** significant at 1 % level 
Table A6: Using Intensities: Change in Skilled and Educated Wage Share as Dependent Variable, 1999-2002, 
Fixed Effects Estimation, Three Education Groups, Outsourcing Measures broad DBDBOUTS 111,03  and 
narrow
DBDBOUTS 111,03  
 broad DBDBOUTS 111,03=Ω  broad DBDBOUTS 111,03=Ω narrowDBDBOUTS 111,03=Ω narrowDBDBOUTS 111,03=Ω
 ------------------- Wage Share, Vocational Education ------------------- 
Relative wagemun, 
Vocational skills -0,0172 -0,0137 -0,0174 -0,0142
 (1,23) (0,97) (1,24) (1,01)
Relative wagemun, 
Long education -0,0271 -0,0263 -0,0271 -0,0263
 (4.48)** (4.36)** (4.49)** (4.36)**
ln(Yi,) 0,0043 0,0043 0,0044 0,0044
 (2.09)* (2.08)* (2.12)* (2.10)*
ln(Ki) -0,0014 -0,0017 -0,0014 -0,0016
 (0,72) (0,84) (0,69) (0,80)
Ω/ YDB03 0,0067 -0,0021
 -0,7300 -0,2100
LWΩ/ YDB03  0,0988  0,0412
 (3.39)** -1,3500
HWΩ/ YDB03 -0,0108 -0,0099
 -1,0600 -0,9300
PENDB111/ YDB111 -0,0081  -0,0021  
 (0,24) (0,06)
LWPENDB111/ YDB111 0,2455 0,4057
 (1,32) (2.25)*
HWPENDB111/ YDB111 -0,0646 -0,0733
 (1,45) (1,65)
TECHDB53/ YDB53 0,1420 0,1314 0,1446 0,1346
 (2.75)** (2.55)* (2.81)** (2.61)**
 ------------------- Wage Share, Vocational Education ------------------- 
Relative wagemun, 
Vocational skills -0,0271 -0,0263 -0,0271 -0,0263
 (4.48)** (4.36)** (4.49)** (4.36)**
Relative wagemun, 
Long education 0,0299 0,0302 0,0299 0,0302
 (5.59)** (5.63)** (5.58)** (5.65)**
ln(Yi,) -0,0171 -0,0172 -0,0171 -0,0172
 (10.22)** (10.25)** (10.20)** (10.27)**
ln(Ki) 0,0104 0,0102 0,0104 0,0102
 (6.39)** (6.28)** (6.43)** (6.30)**
Ω/ YDB03 0,0082 0,0041
 (1,10) (0,52)
LWΩ/ YDB03 0,0404 0,0713
 (1,72) (2.89)**
HWΩ/ YDB03 0,0003 -0,0074
 (0,03) (0,86)
PENDB111/ YDB111 -0,0147 -0,0101
 (0,53) (0,37)
LWPENDB111/ YDB111 0,3289 0,3105
 (2.19)* (2.14)*
HWPENDB111/ YDB111 -0,0765 -0,0692
 (2.12)* -1,9300
TECHDB53/ YDB53 0,2389 0,2310 0,2411 0,2301
 (5.73)** (5.54)** (5.80)** (5.53)**
Observations 5651 5651 5651 5651
Note: * significant at 5 % level; ** significant at 1 % level 
